[Collaborative post by Mateusz 'j00ru' Jurczyk & Gynvael Coldwind]
Early Sunday morning discussion has resulted in j00ru coming up with an idea to mitigate some variants of kernel exploitation techniques by introducing a CPU feature that would disallow execution control transfers in kernel-mode to code residing in user memory area pages (e.g. addresses < 0x80000000 on a 32-bit Windows with default settings). The idea was that the system would mark every page as either being allowed to execute code in ring-0 or not. And hey, guess what... Intel has already proposed such a feature a month ago! Furthermore, it seems that this exact idea was already described in 2008 by Joanna Rutkowska, and two days ago she has published a follow up post on her blog.
Pełna wersja posta jest dostępna po angielskiej stronie lustra (zgodnie z poprzednimi ustaleniami).
Links / Blogs
- → dragonsector.pl
- → vexillium.org
- Security/Hacking:
- Reverse Eng./Low-Level:
- Programming/Code:
Posts
- Crow HTTP framework use-after-free,
- Crowbleed (Crow HTTP framework vulnerability),
- Treebox - Python AST sandbox challenge from Google CTF 2022,
- An informal review of CTF abuse,
- Debug Log: Why is my M.2 SSD so slow?,
- Screams of Power vulnerabilities (Powertek-based PDUs),
- Google's Beginner Quest 2021 - all tasks solved recording,
- Seventh Inferno vulnerability (some NETGEAR smart switches),
- Draconian Fear vulnerability (some NETGEAR smart switches),
- Demon's Cries vulnerability (some NETGEAR smart switches),
- → see all posts on main page
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